What I Got Wrong: Lessons Learned in Liberia This Past Summer
Posted by Jenny Stefanotti on Sunday, September 27, 2009
Under: Policy Making
Well, this might not be the brightest move, as I send out my resume with links to this blog. But since last Monday's Liberia Foundations Meeting, I've been thinking a lot about my work this summer and I think it's worth sharing what I would have done differently. Then we can both learn from my mistakes. I'm not embarrassed to have made them: I think that many of us in the development community make them, including some of the loudest voices out there.
What I learned should have been blatantly obvious: the technically correct solution is only the starting point. You've got to bend it to the political and capacity realities on the ground. Lant Pritchett tells us to care about three things: that our recommendations are technically correct, administratively feasible, and politically supportable. But it's really a whisper within a curriculum that's heavily, heavily weighted towards teaching us how to come up with the technically correct solution. In the first year, seven courses focused on economic theory and econometrics, vs. a single course in management.
So in retrospect, while I do strongly believe that I envisioned initiatives that could have significant impact on technology adoption and development in Liberia, I don't think there's sufficient political support nor capacity to move them forward. I spent a considerable time vetting my ideas with all of the relevant stakeholders within the government and assumed that if either were an issue I would get push back, and I didn't.
But now, two months after leaving Liberia, I am pretty sure that even if I do commit to continuing to push these forward they will not come to fruition. If no one is willing to take them over now, why would they be willing to take them over six months from now? In the scope of the Liberian government's priorities, this doesn't make the cut. I feel like I should have anticipated this and suggested more feasible alternatives. Or perhaps, coming from an organization outside of those who would ultimately own these initiatives, I was doomed from the outset.
This is what brings me one of the loudest voices: Jeff Sachs, and what about the Millennium Villages sits wrong with me. Doing something on a small scale doesn't necessarily mean it's feasible on a large scale. It proves the technically correct component in a petri dish, ignoring the critical political and capacity constraints of the macro level. Unless of course, you plan to operate outside of government and through your own organization. Which has significant unintended consequences with respect to the former and just isn't scalable with respect to the latter.
In an environment where it seems the technocrats have the loudest voice, my lesson learned this summer bears repeating: the technically correct solution is only the starting point. You've got to bend it to the political and capacity realities on the ground.
And this, of course, is what makes the development challenge so very complex.
What I learned should have been blatantly obvious: the technically correct solution is only the starting point. You've got to bend it to the political and capacity realities on the ground. Lant Pritchett tells us to care about three things: that our recommendations are technically correct, administratively feasible, and politically supportable. But it's really a whisper within a curriculum that's heavily, heavily weighted towards teaching us how to come up with the technically correct solution. In the first year, seven courses focused on economic theory and econometrics, vs. a single course in management.
So in retrospect, while I do strongly believe that I envisioned initiatives that could have significant impact on technology adoption and development in Liberia, I don't think there's sufficient political support nor capacity to move them forward. I spent a considerable time vetting my ideas with all of the relevant stakeholders within the government and assumed that if either were an issue I would get push back, and I didn't.
But now, two months after leaving Liberia, I am pretty sure that even if I do commit to continuing to push these forward they will not come to fruition. If no one is willing to take them over now, why would they be willing to take them over six months from now? In the scope of the Liberian government's priorities, this doesn't make the cut. I feel like I should have anticipated this and suggested more feasible alternatives. Or perhaps, coming from an organization outside of those who would ultimately own these initiatives, I was doomed from the outset.
This is what brings me one of the loudest voices: Jeff Sachs, and what about the Millennium Villages sits wrong with me. Doing something on a small scale doesn't necessarily mean it's feasible on a large scale. It proves the technically correct component in a petri dish, ignoring the critical political and capacity constraints of the macro level. Unless of course, you plan to operate outside of government and through your own organization. Which has significant unintended consequences with respect to the former and just isn't scalable with respect to the latter.
In an environment where it seems the technocrats have the loudest voice, my lesson learned this summer bears repeating: the technically correct solution is only the starting point. You've got to bend it to the political and capacity realities on the ground.
And this, of course, is what makes the development challenge so very complex.
In : Policy Making
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