Developing Jen

Dear Editors of the Harvard Kennedy Citizen,

The earthquake in Haiti has shocked and saddened us all. We have been inspired, though, by the outpouring of support from the Harvard Community. At the same time, relief and reconstruction are currently entering a critical stage: while concerned actors must continue to mobilize support, the challenge becomes to utilize donations and efforts in the most efficacious ways. The task is not as easy as simply giving money: experiences during natural disasters have taught harsh lessons, namely that financial donations that are forthcoming in the immediate aftermath of a disaster often pour in and overwhelm local systems; and yet, after the initial deluge, monies are not sustained long enough to address longer-term challenges (including critical infrastructure, security, social services, and institutional capacity building) that can allow a country to rebuild itself. The 2004 Tsunami is an iconic example of the ill-effects of having funds pour in in ways that are disconnected with capacity and needs assessment; we should now be concerned aid will even more acutely inundate relief organizations in Haiti.

It is with this in mind that we raise the following issues based on our respective experiences assisting in crises in Somalia, Burma, Lebanon, many places affected by the Tsunami, Katrina, etc., arguing that citizen donors are ultimately responsible for maximizing the impact of their donations:

1. Money is often not the limiting factor: Coordination (interagency and with governments), logistics, human resources/capacity, and security are often larger constraints; excessive funds often exacerbate these problems;

2. High-Impact Short-term Funds: Therefore, donated funds should be used optimally, allocated to NGOs only based on their absorption capacity. Even organizations with such capacity may be legally constrained from carrying over funding from one fiscal year to another and may be compelled to disburse funding hastily on endeavors of limited impact. The donor community should emphasize transparency in aid monies received, so that funds can be allocated in the most effective ways.

3. Sustained Long-term Funding: Funding that exceeds current absorptive capacity can be better utilized by:

a. Disbursing funds to organizations that have the legal and administrative capabilities to manage and spend the funds over a longer time period, as well as the competency and experience to engage in post-natural disaster redevelopment work;

b. Placing funds with organizations that will have the long-term scope, organizational reach, and capacity to disburse funds to viable but capacity-constrained NGOs on the ground;

c. Build on previous models (in Pakistan, for instance [ii]) that encourage donors to make long-term incremental pledges rather than one-off donations.

Finally, we would also encourage all members of the Harvard Community to go beyond disaster relief support to consider the deep and enduring problem of Haiti's underdevelopment. Some, such as columnist David Brooks of the New York Times ("The Underlying Tragedy" Jan 14, 2010 [iii]), have simplified and distorted the issue by advancing an argument that it is Haiti's 'culture' that has determined its poverty. Harvard Professor Paul Farmer, someone who knows Haiti better than Mr. Brooks, reminds us that "systemic studies of extreme suffering suggest that the concept of culture should enjoy only an exceedingly limited role in explaining the distribution of misery...'Culture' does not explain suffering; it may at worst furnish an alibi" (Pathologies of Power (2003), pp 48-49). Here that alibi - Brooks' idea that one should blame voodoo for Haiti's underdevelopment (also demeaning a value system, while apotheosizing Judeo-Christian ethics as the standard bearer) - encourages an elision of the far more relevant political and economic causes of Haiti's underdevelopment. To wit, Haiti's 20th century has been characterized by direct and indirect U.S. military occupation and domination. In the 1910s, the US invaded and occupied directly, at which point it literally rewrote the Haitian Constitution to allow ownership and exploitation of Haitian resources by foreign capital, and where it refashioned the police in order to put down peasant resistance to these policies (an operation where 50,000 peasants may have died).  Throughout the rest of the century the US supported Haitian military coups and presided over unsustainable extraction of natural resources by transnational corporations. It was no accident that the agriculture sector collapsed, massive out-migration resulted, and diseases like AIDS run rampant. These are not accidents of history, but clear results of geopolitical and global economic machinations (see Farmer's AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame, 1992: pp 178-190).

Therefore, fighting reactionary and opportunistic discourses such as Brooks', both in our Harvard Community and beyond, is the responsibility of those here committed to justice. Indeed, speaking back to the Brooks's is a critical aspect of "what we can do to help, " provided that it duly leads to a deeper interrogation into the ways in which we are complicit in the political-economic foundations that exacerbate disasters like these, and to the extent that such an interrogation spurs a commitment to work to alter systems and structures that allow such exploitation to endure. By participating in this kind of justice project we seek to prevent similar degrees of suffering in the future, for Haitians and for millions of others across the underdeveloped world alike.

Sincerely,

Elliott Prasse-Freeman, Dalia Al Kadi, Marcos Ferreriro

[i] The Economist describes the negative effects of an overflow of funds during the Tsunami, and outlines the potential relevance now for Haiti

[ii] http://www.developpakistan.org/Default.aspx?tabid=149

[iii] New York Times, January 14, 2010